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Rabin: Moral Rights

MORAL RIGHTS AND THE REALISTIC
LIMITS OF ARTISTIC CONTROL
Artists, musicians, and authors have a substantial need to
protect their work from being presented to the public in a distorted form. In addition to their insecurity in depending on the
public for financial support, most artists are relatively unsophisticated in the business, commercial, and legal aspects of their
art. It is essential that artists understand the scope and limits of
available protections - statutory, judicial, contractual, or
otherwise.
Protection of artistic works raises difficult issues, some of
which do not lend themselves to legal analysis and solutions.
Foremost is the question: When has an artistic work been altered in such a way that the author/artist/composer may be
damaged economically or personally? Other questions arise, such
as: Has the original work been diluted and mutilated? Who is
competent to decide? How far may authorized adaptations deviate in order to express the adapter's personal vision? To what
degree do technological requirements affect the transfer of a
work of art from one medium to another? Who should reshape
the work to suit the newer medium? And finally, what protections are available for the creator's reputation and personality?
There exists a growing tendency to recognize rights in personality and in the integrity of the creator's work. While it i.s laudable
to champion increased rights for artists, there are problems and
conflicts apparent in proposing to expand the right of integrity
in the United States"
This Comment explores the relative positions of musical
composers, visual artists, and writers against the available legal
protections for their personal rights. As one author recognizes:
"[E]ven as American law begins to recognize artists' rights be1. Support for statutory or judicial recognition by the United States of a moral
rights doctrine can be found in a number of thorough and well-reasoned law review articles. See, e.g., Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other
Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244 (1978); Berg, Moral Rights and the Compulsory License for Phonorecords, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 67 (1979).
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yond copyright, it does so within a tradition that is concerned
for the interests of many parties."2
We are the music-makers,
And we are the dreamers of dreams,
Wandering by lone sea-breakers,
And sitting by desolate streams;
World -losers and world-forsakers,
On whom the pale moon gleams:
Yet we are the movers and shakers
Of the world for ever, it seems.s

The ancient troubadours had few restraints on their artistic
expression. As they wandered, dependent on the spontaneous
generosity of their listeners, they freely composed ballads out of
current events. Whatever audience a troubadour could capture
would be surprised either by new words to familiar melodies
(sometimes secular variations on sacred hymns) or completely
fresh material. As the early ballads spread, other balladeers
modified them to suit their own talents and style, or their personal tastes in melody and meter. Names and other facts in the
songs were freely adapted to suit a particular locale, and true
authorship was difficult to fix.
Perhaps early ballad-makers longed for some protection to
prevent distortion of their songs and damage to their artistic
reputations. Perhaps they wished a monopoly over exploitation
of their ballads for economic benefits. Today, the need for economic safeguards is met by federal copyright law, which provides the copyright owner with the exclusive rights to reproduce,
distribute, publicly perform, or display the creative artist's work,
and to prepare derivative works! The federal statute does not,
however, explicitly protect the artist's personal rights, generally
called "moral rights."
2. Da Silva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. CR. Soc. 1, 56 (1980). The author
points up the limitations in application of the French statute, and questions whether
vesting the artist with the moral right of integrity is the fairest and most effective way to
ensure that artists' interests are protected. [d. at 12, 37.
3. A.W.E. O'Shaughnessy, Ode, A LITTLE TREASURY OF GREAT POETRY 676 (0. Williams ed. 19(7).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
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RECOGNITION OF MORAL RIGHTS

The doctrine of moral rights exists in many civil law nations
as a separate interest from the protection of the artist's economic rights. "It includes non-property attributes of an intellectual and moral character which give legal expression to the intimate bond which exists between a literary or artistic work and
its author's personality; it is intended to protect his personality
as well as his work."6 Under this doctrine, the creator of an artistic work exercises rights in three main areas: 1) he may control publication and may withhold or withdraw the work from
publication; 2) he may have his name associated with the work
or protect his anonymity with a pseudonym, or he may protect
against false attribution; and 3) he may control modifications
and alterations of the work to prevent its distortion or
mutilation. 8
Most European countries are members of the Berne Convention which provides standards for the protection of droit
moral, or moral rights. 7 Basi~ally, two rights are described: the
5. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMPo L. 465, 465 (1968).
6. Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 245 (1978).
7. UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Berne Copyright Union,
Paris Act, Article 6 bis (2) (1971). Article 6, a revision of the 1928 Rome text of the
Berne Convention, reads:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at
least until the expiration of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those coUntries whose legislation, at the moment of their
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the
protection after the death of the author of all the rights set
out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of
these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted
by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
[d.
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right of paternity (the right to have one's authorship recognized), and the right of integrity (the right to prevent others
from mutilating one's work).8 In one French case, the right of
integrity was upheld when artist Bernard Buffet was able to oppose the sale of separate elements of the refrigerator he had
painted, claiming the decoration was done as an integral artistic
unit. 9 French law extends recognition of moral rights to the right
of disclosure (the right to decide when or whether one's work is
completed), and the right to withdraw or disavow (limited by
the author's obligation to compensate a publisher for losses incurred by withdrawal of the work).lo
Recognition of moral rights is well established in Europe,
deriving largely from judicial decisions of French courts since
the middle of the nineteenth century. When the rules that came
out of these decisions became codified in 1957, respect for the
work of art was supported by statute. l l "Even before droit moral
was codified, French jurists recognized that droit moral is attached not to the work, but to the person who created it, and
thus it remains vested in the artist even after the object itself
has been transferred. "l2
While the United States has not yet given official acknowledgement to a moral rights doctrine, the courts have struggled
over the years to find a reasonable theory on which to uphold
personal rights. Federal copyright law is designed to protect an
author's economic rights by providing a limited-term monopoly
over exploitation of the author's work lS and remedial measures
against infringement.14 The thrust of the statute is to grant protections to the proprietary interests of the copyright owner, who
.
may not be the artistic creator.
8.Id.
9. Judgment of May 30, 1962, [1962) D. Jur. 570 (Cours d'appel Paris); Judgment of
July 6, 1965, [1965) Gaz. Pal. 2, 126 (Cour de Cessation).
10. Sarraute, supra note 5, at 467, 477.
11. Id. at 465, 466.
12. De Silva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. CR. Soc. 1, 12 (1980).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
14. Id. §§ 501-510.
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FEDERAL STATUTORY PROTECTIONS

When the Copyright Act was revised in 1976, some of the
changes were designed to bring the Act into conformity with international copyright doctrine and practice. Protection is now
one-term 11l and available without formalities. 11l Limited recognition of a moral right for music composers is now part of the
statute. 17
Provided the owner of the copyright in a musical composition has authorized the initial distribution of a recording of the
work, anyone else who so desires may obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute his own recording of the composition by paying the prescribed statutory royalties to the composer. III This scheme represents a compromise between the
desire to encourage composers to continue creating (by providing them assurance of regulation of royalty collections) while
discouraging monopoly within the recording industry, so that
copyrighted music is accessible to the public. 1e
The music industry has always supported the compulsory
license aspect of the copyright statute which secures their access
to copyrighted music. Fears were expressed early that any grant
by a composer or copyright proprietor of exclusive rights would
permit monopolization of recording rights to popular music,
"and by controlling these copyrights monopolize the business of
manufacturing and selling music producing machines, otherwise
free to the world. "20
The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act reveals the
15. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976). A single term measured by the life of the author plus
fifty years is consistent with most countries of the world.
16. Id. §§ 405(8), 408(a).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). Once an authorized sound recording is distributed to the
public, section· 115(a) (2) provides: "A compulsory license includes the privilege of making
a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or
manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work . . . . " Id.
18. Note, Moral Rights and the Compulsory License for Phonorecords, 46 BROOK.
L. REV. 67 (1979).
19. Case Comment, Copyright· Compulsory Licensing, Similar Use and Piracy, 10
SUFFOLK L. REv. 1275, 1278 (1976).
20. H.R. REP. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
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legislative intent of section 115: "The second clause of subsection (a) is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited
privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a
compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted, distorted, or travestied."21 This is directly analagous to
the right of integrity component of droit moral recognized under
French law/a2
One experienced attorney who represents recording artists
has serious questions about the extent of changes that may be
made in arranging a song. He comments that the compulsory license section is vaguely worded, and that a judge may not have
the appropriate understanding of music to make an easy or
proper determination.lIs Some freedom must be given to the licensee in making his own creative product short of altering the
integrity of the underlying composition. The arranger has the
right to create an "individual instrumental or· vocal
arrangement. "24
Although the 1976 Copyright Act preempts coextensive
state protection, the Act preserves other federal remedies. IS Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademarks Act,28 while primarily a
law preventing deceptive packaging of goods in interstate commerce, has been interpreted to encompass a range of deceptive
trade practices, including those resulting in false attribution and
distortion of literary and artistic works.1I7 A singer brought suit
successfully under this theory when the re-release of an old album presented his old style and old songs to his public. The
court found that the current likeness of the singer on an album
cover constituted a misrepresentation because the recording was
more than ten years old. 28
21. Copyright Law Revision of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 109,
(1976).
22. Rosen, Droit Moral for Musical Compositions: Section 115 of the New Copyright Act, 5 ART AND THE LAW 88 (1980).
23. Telephone interview with Stanley Diamond, practicing music law attorney, Los
Angeles (September I, 1983).
24. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp. 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1976).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
27. Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530, 185 U.S.P.Q. 508 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
28. [d. at 531. See, infra, note 29 and accompanying text in which the Lanham Act
is broadly applied.
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THE MONTY PYTHON CASE

The case that has stirred up the most excitement over moral
rights is the "Monty Python" case,lIB in which the Second Circuit
articulated the frustration of trying to grant relief for violations
of personal rights when no explicit statutory protection is available. The case involved the unauthorized deletion of twenty-four
out of ninety minutes of a program made by Monty Python, the
popular British comedy group. ABC made the deletions so commercials could be inserted, and censored portions that they
found offensive or obscene. The district court found that the
cuts impaired the integrity of the work causing it to lose its
"iconoclastic verve. "SO Although the court formally based relief
on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which was intended to deal
solely with the use of trademarks for false ·advertising, the rationale of the court reveals outright recognition of droit moral. S }
In his majority opinion, Judge Lumbard stated that although American copyright law recognizes only economic rights,
these rights are so closely tied to personal or moral rights as to
be nearly indistinguishable:
[Although] courts have recognized that licensees
are entitled to some small degree of latitude in arranging the licensed work for presentation to the
public in a manner consistent with the licensee's
style or standards . . . the cuts made [by ABC]
constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty
Python's work. This cause of action, which seeks
redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds
its roots in the continental concept of droit moral,
or moral right, which may generally be summarized as including the right of the artist to have
his work attributed to him in the form in which
he created it.sa

The court's attitude clearly is that copyright law should be the
vehicle to recognize the position of the artist and the need for
adequate legal protection. Such protection encourages produc29. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21, 192
U.S.P.Q. 1, 5-8 (CA 1 1976).
30. [d. at 18.
31. Rosen, supra note 22, at 89.

32. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-4.
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tion and dissemination of artistic works. 33
The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) entered an
agreement with Monty Python in which the comedy group reserved control over editing. The BBC was not permitted to grant
editing rights to ABC in the sub-license agreement. The recorded program was a derivative work based on the script in
which Monty Python held the copyright. The recorded program's copyright was owned by the BBC, but its use of the recorded program was "limited by the license granted to BBC by
Monty Python for use of the underlying script. "34
Under the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act, if the author has not transferred rights, any derivative version or public
performance of the work would be an infringement of the author's copyright. 31i However, once the author has authorized an
adaptation, under the Act the author may not legally object to
the artistic result as long as the result conforms to the boundaries of the transfer agreement. 38 "One who obtains permission to
use a copyrighted script in the production of a derivative work,
however, may not exceed the specific purpose for which permission was granted. "37
Due to the extent of the editing and the breach of the contractual provisions regarding editing, the court concluded there
was a likelihood of copyright infringement. Because the broadcast version departed substantially from the original work, the
court found a valid cause of action for the distortion under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 38 Judge Gurfein argued against
the section 43(a) claim in his dissent, commenting that the statute does not deal with artistic integrity or moral rights. 3s
Cases since Gilliam appear to step lightly around the moral
rights stand taken by the Second Circuit. In National Bank of
[d. at 23.
[d. at 19.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
Comment, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act 01 1976,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1505 (1979).
37. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20.
38. [d. at 24-25.
39. [d. at 27.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.,40 the court was persuaded by Gilliam's holding that copyright infringement occurs when a licensee exceeds his license, and that an author has rights over the
context and manner of presentation of his work. The Shaklee
court, however, emphasized contractual rather than intellectual
property rights.41
Another post-Gilliam editing case42 more directly observed
that moral rights have found protection under case law in this
country. The court found the plaintiff's moral right "subsumed
in his contractual right to seek redress for the alleged mutilation
of his article. "43 Again, the courts find it easier to recognize
moral rights when a contract is involved. Even more recently, an
Illinois court44 adopted Gilliam's holding that copyright infringement will be found when a licensee exceeds the license
grant from the copyright holder by performing unauthorized
editing!1I

Gilliam's impact is yet to be fully realized. Unmistakably, a
foundation has been established with the first clearly articulated
acceptance of moral rights by a federal appeals court. The importance of the Second Circuit's decision has not been missed.
When "the nation's premier copyright court"46 establishes a new
attitude, there is the promise of a new vitality in a doctrine that
was previously avoided.
IV.

STATE PROTECTION FOR VISUAL ARTISTS

Recognition of the need for expanded protection is growing,
particularly in relation to visual artists. One commentator47 suggests that visual artists create in a rather solitary manner. Consequently, associations are not formed as in the case of other
creative artists. Musicians and composers have protective options available such as unions, performance rights societies (e.g.,
40.
41.
42.
(1979).
43.
44.

National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (1980).
[d. at 544.
Edison v. Viva International, Ltd., 70 App. Div. 2d 379, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 203

[d. at 421 N.Y.S. at 206.
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 693 F.2d 622 (1982).
45. [d. at 625.
46. Gracen v. Bradford, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
47. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 S.D.L. REv. 675, 678 (1982).
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ASCAP and BMI), as well as the federal copyright statute. Writers for television and film are bolstered by membership in active
national and local unions and guilds. Novelists, choreographers,
directors, scene designers, and other entertainment industry
professionals also look to their unions and guilds for advice,
comfort, and strength. Support groups and professional organizations are less available to visual artists; therefore, legal protections are essential.
Fine artists in California (creators of paintings, sculptures
or drawings) have recently been afforded statutory protection4S
to prevent the intentional "physical defacement, mutilation, alteration or destruction"4e of the artist's work, including the right
to claim or disclaim authorship. GO While no case law has yet
emerged testing the statute, the influence of this bold legislation
is beginning to be felt elsewhere. Gl
V.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RELIEF

Without a formal moral rights statute addressing the works
of writers, and without protection broader than that offered
composers under the compulsory license section of the Copyright Act, artists will continue to seek redress of violations
through alternative theories. Over the years the success rate has
been inconsistent. While a number of opinions make reference to
moral rights, the courts usually seek a contract or unfair practices basis for granting relief. In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.,GZ the
. 48. The California Art Preservation Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (Deering
Supp. 1982).
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (Deering Supp. 1982).
SO. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d) (Deering Supp. 1982).
51. New York has recently passed its own moral rights statute for visual artists similar to the California legislation. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 228-m (1983). Legislation in this
area is even more notable coming as it does from the two states with the largest population of artists, including major artists, and which are the centers of the publishing, art,
and entertainment industries. The impact on other jurisdictions throughout the country
is as yet unmeasured. In fact, no case law has yet emerged testing the California statute.
52. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
813 (1948). The court expressed its discomfort with the moral rights issue:
Plaintiff advances another theory which needs little discus-.
sion. It is predicated upon the contention that there is a distinction between the economic rights of an author capable o(
assignment and what are called "moral rights" of the author
said to be necessary for the protection of his honor and integrity. . . . What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law
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Seventh Circuit was unwilling to recognize an artist's paternity
right. The artist had sold his drawings to Esquire magazine,
which published them without attributing authorship to Vargas.
Without a contractual provision requiring that Vargas' name be
used, the court refused to allow a presumption of an agreement
allowing the artist to claim authorship. Such unwillingness is not
surprising considering there is no historical context in this country for an inherent right to claim authorship. Our copyright statute, in fact, provides that in the case of a work made for hire the
. employer may be considered the author. liS
Relief was granted in a Second Circuit case" in which record producer Norman Granz contracted with the purchaser of
his master recordings to require that credit to Granz be printed
on the record labels. Abbreviated versions of the recordings were
sold (bearing Granz's name on the jackets) and Granz objected.
The court found a breach of the contract and false representation leading to unfair competition. 1I11 Once again, droit moral was
considered and was seen as inappropriate as the basis for the
decision.1I6
Artists are understandably confused with divurgent results
such as these. Vargas had no specific contract clause requiring
artist credit while Granz managed to obtain such an express provision. Without a statutory right in paternity, American courts
are generally unwilling to provide relief when the parties have
no contractual duties for the court to adjudge. Perhaps, too, the
in this country to conform to that of certain other countries.
We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to make any new
law in this respect.

Id.
53.
54.
55.
56.

17 U.S.C. § 20I(b) (1976).
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
[d.
Id. at 590. (Frank, J. concurring)
[I)t is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a
version which substantially departs from the original . . .
[however) without rejecting the doctrine of "moral right," I
think that, in the light of the foregoing, we should not rest
decision on that doctrine where, as here, it is not necessary to
do so.
Id. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors,
and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
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Granz court was more sympathetic than the Vargas court because of the nature of the defendant's conduct in deleting eight
minutes of performance from Granz's recordings.1I'7
Some latitude is granted licensees to adapt a work in light
of industry practice, yet an express contractual provision to enjoin editing will be upheld. liB Relief was denied in a case involving Otto Preminger's movie, "Anatomy of a Murder," because it
was found that the proposed cuts in the film were within acceptable limits. However, the court noted that substantial cuts could
be described as "mutilation" and said: "Should such 'mutilation'
occur in the future, plaintiffs may make application to this
Court for injunctive or other relief. . . ."1i9
A prominent film director who had retained editing rights in
his contract unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a television network
from editing his feature film. so While the court was impressed
with the "unusual and rare grant to plaintiff of sole control over
production,"sl they agreed with the trial court that the commercial interruptions did not affect the integrity of the film. They
further took notice of testimony that "plaintiff's ability to command the highest compensation was not adversely affected by
the televising of his films."s2 As in the Preminger case, the court
felt impelled to interpret the contract according to the prevailing custom in the trade which allows stationmasters the right to
use their judgment regarding cutting and editing. s8 Perhaps an
attentive attorney could have preserved the protections sought
by Preminger and the movie owner. A stronger case is made
when editing is evaluated as violative of an agreement between
the parties.
A New York courts. questioned the existence of a moral
57. Granz, 198 F.2d at 588.
58. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc.2d 363, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 594 (1966),
aff'd without op. 25 App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd without op. 18 N.Y.2d 659,
219 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
59. [d.
60. Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 C.A.2d 886, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106 (2nd
Dist. 1969).
61. [d. at 893.
62. [d.

63. Preminger, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 599, 600.
64. Shostakovich v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S. 2d
575, 579, 77 aff'd 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
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right, though the claim was based on defamation, rather than on
distortion of the plaintiffs' work. Several Russian composers
brought suit because the use of their public domain music in the
sound track of a film cast upon them the false imputation of
being disloyal to their country, due to the film's political attitude. The court was hesitant to grant relief without a clear
showing of the existence of libel, and "in the absence of any
clear showing. . . of any invasion of a moral right. . . ."eG Perhaps if the composers' music was not in the public domain, the
result would have been different. The artists would then be entitled to protection under copyright law and would have more
control over the use of their creations in a context which is not
offensive to their beliefs. When the same composers brought suit
in France, historically a more receptive forum, they succeeded
with their libel claim, proving violation of their moral rights, and
prevented the showing of the same film.66
On a theory of invasion of privacy, John Lennon succeeded
in preventing distribution of a recording of his music on the
grounds that the poor quality of both the recording and the album cover design amounted to mutilation of his work and injury
to his reputation. 67 Evidence was presented that Lennon and his
wife had posed nude for a previous album cover, to support the
defendant's argument that Lennon's reputation was already impure. The court maintained that the trial court had come to the
correct conclusion: the album cover was "cheap-looking, if not
ugly," and the quality of the recording was "shoddy and
fuzzy. "68 Fortunately for Lennon, the court was able to compare
this album to Lennon's other work and appreciate the difference
in quality. Another court with different musical taste and judgment might produce a contrary assessment. The Lennon decision raises the issue that the artist may be a victim of a court's
subjective response to a piece of art.
When special knowledge is required to analyze and understand a particular cause of action, expert testimony is usually
provided by both sides. While experts in computer technology,
medicine, or even auto repair may differ, at least objective mea65.Id.
66. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1952, [1952) D. Jur. II 204 (Cours d'appel Paris).
67. Big Seven Music v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
68.Id.
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surements, tests, and standards based on industry practices are
available for consideration. The arts do not lend themselves to
such objectifying. Certainly, standards of taste exist and "classics" are universally recognized. But for a pop song, a new play
by an unknown writer, a sculpture by a new artist, where are the
tests? Which critic can claim that his or her personal taste is the
most refined? While these questions are unanswerable, the insecurity of the artist's position is imp·ortant to recognize.
When contractual protections were lacking in another New
York case69 the court was still inclined to find a theory for granting relief because, as the plaintiff claimed, the paperback reprint
of a book altered the original text so extensively, primarily by
omissions, as to constitute mutilation. A moral rights claim, the
court suggested, is given limited recognition in New York, and is
usually tied up with contractual terms. Yet, the court demonstrated its recognition of the problem when it stated, "[e]ven after a transfer or assignment of an author's work, the author has
a property right that it shall not be used for a purpose not intended or in a manner which does not fairly represent the creation of the author."70 The defendant publisher was ordered to
inform the public that omissions and juxtapositions were made
in the paperback version of the plaintiff's book. 71 A judicial
stance of this nature is a hopeful sign that American courts are
beginning to recognize, as do the Europeans, that an author has
personal rights which remain with him even after proprietary
rights have been transferred. While such recognition has been
slow in coming, every vindication of a creator's rights along
these lines has an influence on future judicial determinations.
VI.

PROBLEMS AND EVALUATION

Editorial tampering is the historical enemy of a writer.
Other concerns shared by writers are offered by a legal scholar
who has studied the fields of publishing, entertainment, and the
arts:
What if he sells a story and it is never published?
69. Chesler v. Avon Book Division, Hearst Publications, Inc., 76 Misc._2d 1048,352
N.Y.S. 2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
70. [d.
71. [d.
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What if he sells an article, and a "collaborator" is
foisted on him who then gets co-authorship
credit? What if he sells an article that represents
his views on a certain subject as of the time of
writing, and the article is not published until
years later when his views have changed? What if
he sells an article to a publication of some repute,
and later finds that it appears (via a transfer in
bankruptcy, say) in another of dubious standing?
While these questions might not arise as frequently as those pertaining to editorial interference, they are by no means as rare as one might
suppose. 7lI

A.

Adaptation

A common occurrence in the entertainment world is the licensing by a relatively unknown writer of a work of fiction to a
major television studio or to a film production company. Invariably, the author is not permitted to transfer the work to the
screenplay format required for the medium.· Experienced staff
writers who understand the technology of television or film are
given the job of adaptation.
Moral rights are at issue when a work is adapted to another
medium. Many writers view adaptions with suspicion as a possible distortion or mutilation of their underlying work. When the
new author arrives at his or her attorney's office with a contract
offer, there is time to negotiate for some control over the adaptation. While editing control is rarely granted unless the writer
commands the privilege by virtue of the writer's fame and desirability, some measure of involvement may be obtained. A writer
can be included as a consultant, or as an associate writer during
the adaptation process or at the editing stage. More success is
likely if the artist is dealing with a small, independent production company willing to relinquish some control.
The adaptation of The French Lieutenant's Woman from
the traditional literary print medium to the technologically ad72. LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS - AGREEMENTS AND THE
LAw, 2308-09 (2d ed. 1983) (three-volume set containing valuable cases, comments and
forms, including agency agreements for talent and creative works).
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vanced medium of film illustrates inherent conflicts, though the
problems never resulted in a lawsuit. When John Fowles' novel
was adapted by the skilled playwright and screenwriter Harold
Pinter, the resultant film was considered "dull and distancing."73
While the movie was generally popular, its limitations kept it
from being a critical success. Pinter, seriously interested in form,
used the device of enclosing the movie within a movie as a way
of dealing with the literary issues of the novel. In the book, the
author created a narrator to discuss nineteenth century novels
as his device for writing a nineteenth century novel. Pinter's
choices and prerogatives were clever, sophistocated, and respectful of the novel's artistic integrity; yet, they did not work." The
adapter was concerned with preserving the original, underlying
book; yet, he was not writing another version of the book - he
was creating another form. Perhaps 'faithfulness to the original'
is an inappropriate standard to determine whether an author's
moral rights have been violated.
Along with the issue of standards arises the critical question: Who decides? The original author may be an excellent
critic of novels, yet may not have the skill or esthetic sense to
judge a screenplay, particularly when he or she is emotionally
attached to the work being adapted. John Fowles was thoroughly satisfied with the film adaptation of his novel, even while
the critics were not. More problems will undoubtedly arise when
the film is shown on television, assuming the author's original
agreement grants subsidiary rights to the film company, as is the
usual industry practice.
Adaptations for television are typically worked into a format of multiple, brief scenes, with visuals occupying a more
prominent position than dialogue. Because television is in the
home, the material is designed to fit into a context of intimacy
and casualness. Television exists as a commercial medium, and
frequent commercial advertisements, usually loud and active,
are inserted to hold the attention of the passive, even somnolent
viewer.7Ii As the Gilliam case points out, however, unauthorized
73. Telephone interview with Paul Singer, Film Critic of The Twin Cities Times
(June 22, 1983).
74. [d.
75. This author's experience as a broadcaster (producer, writer) from 1967-1976 has
provided a perspective on some of the special needs and problems in working with the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/9

16

1984]

Rabin: Moral Rights

MORAL RIGHTS

.463

editing can be considered substantial enough to alter the nature
of the work, and a breach of the license agreement and copyright
infringement may be found. 7~
One French scholar has expressed appreciation of the sensitive issues implicated when an author complains of distortion in
the adaptation process. Just as critical a concern is the position
of the judge in making a purely esthetic appraisal as the basis
for a court decision. 77 He suggests that attorneys simplify the
assignment of rights in adaptation contracts which would avoid
placing the courts in a difficult position and which would make
esthetic disputes unnecessary. One approach grants the author
approval rights over the adaptation. Another arrangement would
permit the author to create the script for a film adaptation of his
or her work, modifications of which would require the author's
consent. The final idea is the realistic alternative to the first two:
"to trust the adapter and accept the risks involved. "78

B. Legal Action
When the new writer is intent on bringing suit for violation
of the personal integrity of his or her writing, the theory indicating the likeliest success is breach of contract. Case histories
demonstrate that the courts are most comfortable determining
rights and obligations of the parties according to the promises
set forth in a written agreement. If the contract is silent in the
particular area surrounding the violation, the writer's attorney
may have to research customs in the trade and prior conduct
between the licensee and other writer!? If the defendant is a production company that often turns good writing into pornographic scripts, the court will likely find that the writer should
have known such reputation. If plot elements are rearranged, the
court would likely look at whether the writer's work appears garbled or mutilated before granting relief. Unless the court is highly offended by the defendant's conduct, the interests of both
sides will be balanced.
medium of television.
76. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20-21, 192 U.S.P.Q. 5-8.
77. Sarraute, supra note 5 at 482.
78. [d.
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If express provisions of a contract have not been breached,
yet the writer is dissatisfied with the treatment of his or her
work, a theory of invasion of privacy or false representation may
succeed in obtaining equitable relief. If the quality of a filmed
version of the author's work is amateurish, poorly adapted,
poorly performed, or difficult to see or hear, the artist's attorney
may be able to bring a successful libel action, arguing injury to
the writer's reputation and loss of future writing offers.

Statutory violations are another area in which the courts
appear comfortable when called upon to assess a moral rights
argument. A claim may succeed if the writer can show that the
extent to which his or her story has been rewritten fundamentally changes its nature so that the public would be misled to
believe the writer was the source of the work. If a television station interrupts the story excessively, changes key story elements,
or alters the characters, the court may find a violation of the
Lanham Act,79 insofar as the writer is presented to the public as
the creator of a work not his or her own.
When the writer argues that the serious manipulation of his
or her story, language, or characters exceeds the boundaries of
the transfer agreement, the court may find an infringement of
the federal copyright statute. When the underlying work is used
in an unauthorized manner and is fragmented or distorted, the
courts are now more inclined to find an infringement of the
writer's copyright control.

C.

Cooperation in the Industry

One experienced attorney sees "sensitive editing of feature
films for television" as the critical concern in the context of
moral rights. 80 Whereas Congress, unlike legislatures in civil law
countries, has appeared reluctant to issue expanded rights to
artists,81 the attorney suggests that the Motion Picture Associa79. 15 u.s.c. § 1125(a) (1970).
Interview with Robert E. Gordon, practicing entertainment law attorney, in San
Francisco (June 23, 1983).
81. Three different attempts were made in recent legislative history to amend the
federal copyright statute by adding a new subsection (d) to section 113 ("Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). Each proposal was sent to a
committee of the Judiciary, with no serious action yet taken. The proposed "Visual Art-

so.
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tion of America (MP AA) set the standards for tasteful, careful
editing, attentive to the input from professional groups such as
the Directors Guild and the Writers Guild.
The television industry alone has yet to set up standards for
the extent of permissible cuts, the maximum number of interruptions, and the duration of the interruptions. Their treatment
of the problem is merely to identify some films as "edited for
television. "82
An affiliation agreement between the major studios and the
guilds would reflect an awareness of the need for editing standards. Such industry cooperation may be the only viable means
of influencing this practice. An author granting film rights is
quite removed from the power level along the production chain.
He or she is often thrilled with the opportunity to have a work
produced, and accepts the position of impotence once the work
is licensed. Some have distinguished themselves sufficiently to
contract for some artistic control over editing. Occasionally protection is lacking because the contract is silent. More often than
not, however, the contract will be written to exclude the artist. 83
ists Moral Rights Amendment" reads:
Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic
or sculptural work, the author or the author's legal representative shall have the right, during the life of the author and fifty
years after the author's death, to claim authorship of such
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded
in the Copyright Office that would prevent prejudice to the
author's honor or reputation.
H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977);
H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
The legislative assistants to Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) report that no hearings .have yet been held on the most recent proposal, but that the resolution was refiled
this session. Telephone interview with Ann Kelly (August 4, 1983), and Bill Black (August 16, 1983).
82.

LINDEY,

supra note 72, at 146.

83. Interview with Chris Door, Producer with Korty Films Co., in Mill Valley, CA.
(August 5, 1983), emphasizing that "compromise is the nature of the film industry," and
that unless one puts up his own money, "the studio and the network have the final cut."
[d.
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D. Emerging Technology - Unknown Encroachments
As new technology changes the face of popular entertainment, the rapid developments delight and frighten us at the
same time. Electronic publishing, among the newest forms to
emerge, is an electronic means of transmitting pictures and text
over the air, by cable, or by telephone wires, displaying the text
on a television screen or other terminal. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently gave television stations permission to broadcast written or graphic information nationwide
using a system called teletext. 84
However, when such apparent freedom is granted to use a
potentially powerful, pervasive medium, self-regulation may be
inadequate. California Lawyer's reporter projects concern when
he states: "There are many unanswered questions about how
copyright, libel, defamation, obscenity and privacy laws will apply to electronic publishing. UBI! Some of those questions may be
addressed if the Media Access Project in Washington, D.C. petitions the FCC for reconsideration of its rulings. Unclear as yet,
are the possible risks to artists and their work when utilized over
this medium.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Until the artist is capable of bargaining from a position of
power, his or her moral rights will be protected only through existing legal doctrines and a sympathetic court. Mutilation, serious alterations, publication of a truncated or garbled version of
an artist's work have been treated by American courts as demanding some relief for the artist. Judicial opinions range from
identifying the right in a work as purely proprietary to recognizing it as obviously personal. Many courts state that without statutory provisions for the protection of personal rights, only a contract between the parties can encompass the desired protections.
More and more, the integrity of the work will be considered deserving of judicial protection, and grounds to support a remedy
for a violation will reach to libel, unfair competition, copyright,
84. Carlson, New Age Front Page,
85. Id. at 18.
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and the right of privacy. The burden of establishing the seriousness·of the invasion and its material harm to the work is placed
upon the artist and artist attorneys. Case law seems to point toward contract as the best basis for protection for writers licensing their work. The weakness of their bargaining position is a
reality, though not a bar to effective negotiation. 86
Recognition of moral rights may never be codified by statute in this country as it is in Europe. Yet, the enactment of the
compulsory license section of the revised copyright statute87 and
the passage in two important states of protective statutes88 for
visual artists strongly indicate a favorable perspective. Legal
scholars are notably encouraged by the interest in moral rights
expressed by the nation's most respected copyright court in the
Gilliam case. 89 The basis for a positive shift in perspective has
been established, suggesting that this country's courts may develop and focus the support for artists' rights.
Since the human rights movements of the '60's, public consciousness of individual rights has continued to develop. Part of
that development is respect for the creative spirit which blossoms most freely when the creator is allowed control over his
means of expression, during and after creation. Recognition of
the artist's personal rights in the integrity of his work is a
healthy trend. A related concern is whether a moral rights doctrine places the artist in the position of censor of the work of
other ·artists who are adapting the creator's work. Again, a balancing of interests is essential. Total control may translate as
total deprivation of the public's need for creative nourishment.
California and New York are pointing the way to an enlightened
perspective regarding creators and their special needs, and our
need to have access to work that is created without fear. As one
86. Another insight from an entertainment industry insider emphasizes the difficulty of a creative artist's position. A writer is encouraged to take a "professional posture" and accept his part in the collaborative enterprise of producing a film or teleplay.
If loss of control over a script sold to a studio or owned by a studio employer is too
difficult to accept, this industry professional suggests the writer find "a medium without
a producer." Telephone interview with Martin Sweeney, Business Representative of the
Writers Guild of Hollywood, (July 28, 1983).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976).
88. See supra note 36 and note 39.
89. Interview with Professor Neil Boorstyn, author of Copyright Law (1981), in San
Francisco, October 18, 1983.
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court admonishes: "Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law
does not require us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary .
production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a
.
barrel of pork. "90

Susan Rabin·

90. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 184, 122 N.V.S. 206, 207 (Sup. Ct.
1910) (Seabury, J. concurring).
• Third-year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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